Introduction
Experienced d l w a r e engineers know that perhaps 30% of the cost of a sostware product goes into specifying it, 10% into coding, and the remaining 60% on maintenance. This has profound effects on computer sciencc. For example, when designing new programming languages the motive nowadays is mostly not to make coding easier, but to cut the costs of maintenance. There has also been massive interest in open source software products such as Linux and Apache, whom maintenance is undertaken hy thouvands of programmors working worldwide in a voluntary and cooperative way.
Open source software is not entirely a recent invention; in the early days of computing most system softwarc vendors published their source code. This openness started to reccdc in the early 1980s wticn pressure of litigation led IBM to adopt an 'objcctcode-only' policy for its mainfranic software, despite bitter criticism from its usor community. The pendulum now seems to he swinging back, with 1,inux and Apachc gaining huge market share.
In his influential paper 'The Cathedral and the Bazaar' [I] , Eric Raymond compares the hierarchical organisation of large software projects in industry ('the cathedral') with tho more open, unstructured approach of cooperative developers ('the bazaar'). He xix 0-7695-0346-2/99 510.00 0 1999 IEEE makes a number of tcllirig observations aboul the efficiency of the latter, such as that "Given enough eyeballs, all hugs are shallow". His more recent paper, 'The Magic Cauldron' [Z] , explores the economic incentivcs that for-profit publishers have found to publish their source codo, and concludes that IBM's critics were right: whcre reliability is paramount, open sourcc is best, as users will cooperate in finding and removing bugs.
There is a corollary to this argnmcnl, which I explore in this paper: the next priority after cutting the costs of maintenance should he cutting the costs of specification, Specification is not only the second most expensive item in the system development life cycle, but is also where the niost expensive things go wrong. Thc seminal stndy by Curtis, Krasner and Iscoe of large software project disasters found that failure to understand the requircments was mostly to blamc [3] : a thin spread of application domain knowledge typically led to fluctuating and conflicting rcqnircments which in turn caused a breakdown in communication. They suggested that thc solution was to find an 'exceptional designer' with a deep 'understanding of thc problem who would assume overall rcsponsibility.
But there are many c a m where an established expert is not availablc, such as when designing a new application from scratch or when building a competitor to a closed, proprietary system whose behavipur can only be observed at a distance.
There are also some particular domains in which spocification is well known to be hard. Sccnrity is one example; the literature has many examples of systems which protected the wrong thing, or protected the right thing but using the wrong mechanisms. Most real life security Sailures result from the opportnnistic exploitation of elementary design flaws rather than 'high-tech' attacks such as cryptanalysis [4] . The list of possible attacks on a typical system is long, and people doing initial security designs are very likely to overlook some of them, Even in a closed environment, the use of multiple independent experts is recommended [5].
Security conspicuously satisfies the five tests which Raymond suggested would identify the products most likely to benefit from an open source approach [2] .
It is based on common engineering knowledge rather than proprietary techniques; it is sensitive to failure; it needs peer review for verification; it is business critical; and its economics include strong network effects. Its own traditional wisdom, going back at least to Auguste Kerkhoffs in 1883, is that cryptographic systems should be designed in such a way that they are not compromised if the opponent learns the technique being used. In other words, the security should reside in the choice of key rather than in obscure design features [GI.
It therefore seemed worthwhile to see if a high quality security specification could be designed in a highly parallel way, by getting a lot of different people to contribute drafts in the hope that most of the passible attacks would be considered in at least one of them.
Experimental design
The opportunity to test this idea was provided by the fact that I teach courses in cryptography and computer security to second and third year undergraduates at Cambridge. By the third year, students should be able to analyse a protection problem systematically by listing the threatu, devising a security policy and then recommending mechanisms that will enforce it, (The syllabus and lecture notes are available online By a security policy, we mean a high level specification which sets out the threats to which a system is assumed to be exposed and the assurance properties which are to be provided in response. Like most specifications, it is a means of communication between the users (who understand the environment) and the system engineers (who will have to implement the encryption, access control, logging or other mechanisms), So it must be clearly comprehensible to both communities; it should also be concise.
The students see, as textbook examples of security policy:
the Bell-LaPadula model, which is commonly used by governments to protect classified information and which states that information can only flow up the classification hierarchy, and never down. Thus a civil servant cleared to 'Secret' can read files at 'Secret' or below, but not 'Top Secret', while a process running at 'Secret' can write at the same level or above, but never down to 'Unclassified'; The Chinese Wall model, which models conflicts of interest in professional practice. Thus an advertising account executive who has worked on one bank's strategy will be prevented from seeing the files on any other banking client for a fixed period of time afterwards;
The British Medical Association model, which describes how flows of personal health information must bo restricted so as to respect the established ethical norms for patient privacy. Only people involved directly in a patient's care should be allowed to access their medical records, unless the patient gives consent or the records are de-identified effectively.
The first three of theso are documented in 181 and the fourth in [SI. h r t h e r examples of security policy models are always welcome, a? they help teach the lesson that 'security' means radically different things in different applications. However, developing a security policy is usually hard work, involving extonsive consnltation with domain experts and successive refinement until a model emerges that is compact, concise and agreed by all parties.
Exceptions include designing a policy for a new application, and for a competitor to a closed system. In such cases, the best we can do may be to think long and hard, and hope that we will not miss anything important.
I therefore set the following exam question to my third year students:
You have been hired b y a company which is bidding to t a k e over the National Lottery w h e n Camelot's franchise expires, and your responsibility is the security policy. State the security policy you would recommend and outline t h e mechanisms you would implement to enforce it. The UK's national lottery is operated by a consortium of companies called Camelot which holds a seven year licence from the government. This licence is up for renewal, which makes the question topical; and presumably Camelot will refuse to share its experience with potential competitors. A large number of franchised retail outlets sell tickets. The customer marks six out of 49 numbers on a form which he hands with his money to the operator; she passes it through a machine that scans it and prints a ticket containing the choice of numbers plus some further coded information to authenticate it.
Twice a week there is a draw on TV at which a machine selects seven numbered balls from 49 in a drum. The customers who have predicted the first six share a jackpot of several million pounds; the odds should be (49 choose 6) nr 13,983,816 to one against, meaning that with niuch of the population playing there are several winners in a typical draw. (Occasionally there are no winners and the jackpot is 'rolled over' to the next draw, giving a pot of many millions of pounds which whips the popular press to a frenzy.) There are also smaller cash prizes for people who guessed only some of the numbers. Half the takings go on prize money; the other half gets shared between Camelot, the taxman and various charitablc good causes'.
The model answer I had prepared had a primary threat model that attackers, possibly in cahoots with insiders, would try to place bets once the result of the draw is known, whether by altering bet records or forging tickets, The secondary threats were that hets would be placed that had not been paid for, and that attackers might operate bogus vending stations which would pay small claims hut disappear if a client won a big prize.
The security policy that follows logically from this is that bets should be registered online with a server which is secured prior to the draw, both against tampering and against the extraction of sufficient information to forge a winning ticket; that there should be credit limits for genuine vendors; and that there should be ways of identifying bogus vendors. Once the security policy has been developed in enough de-'Appointing the members of the committees that dish out the money is a source of v a t patronage for the Prime Minisler and, according to cynics, is the real rewon for the Lottery to exist.
tail, designing enforcement mechanisms should not be too hard for someone skilled in the art -though there are Yome subtleties, as we shall see below.
The exam was set on the first of June 1999 [lo] , and when the scripts wcrc delivered that evening, I
was eager to find out what the students might have come up with.
Results
Thirty four candidates answered the question, and five of their papers were good enough to be kept &? model answers, All of these candidates had original ideas which are incorporated in this paper, as did a further seven candidates whoso answers were less complete. AY the exam marking is anonymous, the 'co-authors' of this specification are a subset of the candidates listed in the ackowledgementv below. The question was a 'good' one in that it divided the students up about equally into first, second and third class ranges of marks. Almost all the original ideas came from the first class candidates.
The contributions came at a number of levcls, including policy goal statements, discussions of particular attacks, and arguments about the merits of particular protection mechanisms.
Policy goal statements
On sorting out the high level policy statcments from the marc detailed contributions, the first thing to catch Lhc cyc was a conflict reminiscent of the old debate over who should pay when a 'phantom withdrawal' happen8 via an automatic teller machinc ~ the customer or the hank [4] .
One of tho candidates assumed that the customor's rights must have precedence: 'All winning tickets must be redeemable! So failures must not allow unregistered tickets to be printed. ' Another candidate assumed the contrary, and thus thc 'worst outcome should be that the jackpot gets paid to the wrong peruon, neuer twice.' Ultimately, whether systems fail in the shop's favour or the customer's is a regulatory issue. IIowevcr, there arc consequences for security. In the context of cash machine disputes, it was noted that if the customer carricv the risk of fraud while only the bank is in a position to improve the security measures, then the bank may get more and more careless until an epidomic of fraud takes place, We presumably want to avoid this kind of 'moral hazard' in a national lottery; perhaps the solution is for disputed sums to he added hack to the prize fund, or distributed to the 'good causes'.
As well as protecting the system from fraud, the operator must also convince the gaming public of this.
xxi
This was expressed in various ways: 'take care how you justify your operations;' 'don't forget the indirect costs of security failure such as TV contract penalties, ticket refund, and publicity of failure leading to bogus claims;' 'at all costs ensure that there is enough backup to prevent unverifiable ticket problems. ' The operator can get some protection by signs such as 'no winnings due unless entry logged' but thiv cover is never total.
Next, a number of candidates argued that it was foolish t o place sole reliance on any single protection mechanism, or any single instance of a particular type of mechanisms. A typical statement was: 'Don't bet the farm on tamper-resistance', For example, if the main threat is Someone forging a winning ticket after tapping the network which the central server uses to send ticket authenticator codes to vending machines, we might not just encrypt the line but also delay paying jackpots for several days to give all winners a chance to claim. (Simply encrypting the aulhentication codes would not he enough, if a technician who dismantled the encryptioii device at the server could get both the authentication keys and the encryption keys.) Translated into methodology, this suggests a security matrix approach which maps the threats to the protection mechanisms, and makes it easy for us to check that at least two indcpendent mechanisms constrain every serious threat.
Various attempts were made to rewe exivting security policies, and particularly Clark-Wilson. These were mostly by weak candidates and not very convincing. But three candidates did get some mileage; for example, one can model the lottery terminal as a device that turns an unconstrained data item (the customer selection) into a constrained data item (the valid lottery ticket) by registering it and printing an authentication code on it. Such concepts can he useful in designing separation-of-duty mechanisms for ticket redemption and general financial control, but do not seem to be enough t o cover all the novel and interesting security problems which a lottery provides.
Some candidates wondered whether a new franchisee would want to extend the existing lottery's business model, such as by allowing people t o buy tickets over the phone or the net. In that case, one should try t o design the policy t o be extensible t o non-material sales channels. (Internet based lottery ticket sales have since been declared t o be a good thing by the government [ 111 .)
Finally, some attention needs to be paid to protecting genuine winners. The obvious issue is safeguarding the privacy of winners who refuse publicity; less ob-
Discussions of particular attacks
This leads t o a discussion of attacks. There were several views on how the threat model should he organised; one succinct statement was 'Any attack that can be done by an outsider can be done at least as well by an insider. So concentrate on insider attacks'. This is something that almost everyone knows, hut which many system designers disrogard in practice. Other Candidates pointed out that no system can defend itself against heing owned by a corrupt organisation, and that senior insiders should be watched with particular care2.
Moving now to the more technical analysis, a number of interesting attack scenarios were explored.
A number of candidates remarked that in the absence of enforceable limits on ticket sales per machine, an operator could issue large numbers of tickets without any intention of paying for them. In extremis, he might issue all 13,983,816 tickets required to win a jackpot. The obvious fix is to have a value counter t o enforce a system of credit limits -but where? If the terminal cannot be completely tamperproof, we need an online solution. But this is not enough: three candidates warned about possible traffic insertion attacks at the server end, so having synchronised value counters at both the terminal and the server might be a good idea3. So would banking industry style batch controls and totals.
Three candidates discussed tricking genuine terminals into attaching to a fake server. The goal might be fraud (after the draw, forge tickets with authenticators calculated using the fake server of the companies that originaliy made up the Camelot uansartiiirn had to leave after its chief executive WBS found by the High Court to have tried to bribe a competing consortium iuring the bidding for the original lottery franchise. 3but see aection 4.3 below on the problems of redundancy xxii key) or denial of service (undermine the lottery's credibility by causing vendors to print tickets which cannot be redeemed if they win). The obvious fix is to have the terminals authenticate the sower.
3.
There was conccrn about tho prospect of a winning ticket being claimed simultaneously at several shops. The general consensus was that an online operation with guaranteed commit-abort semantics and strong authentication of the terminal should he required to pay a winning ticket. 4 . Candidates disagreed about the threat from refunds. If refunds are allowed, then someone might get a refund on a forged tickct and later present the original if it wins. (Historically, refund mechanisms have been a source of frand with systems such a prepaid olcctricity meters 151). The simplest solution is not to allow any refunds at all; and alternative is to allow them only in very restricted circumstances (only lor data eutry errors, only while the customer is still in the shop, ouly up to close of play, only while the terminal is online, and suhject to collection and audit of all refuuded tickets along with all locally paid winning tickets)
6. Although tamper resistance cannot he relied on completely, it can still be helpful. But should we protect the whole vending machine or just an embedded crypto module? If the latter, there is a risk that vendors will tamper with the rest of the system so that it reports only a proportion of their takings, in effect competing with the lottery by issuing the other tickets on their own account. So it is probably a good idea to make the whole vending machine tampor resistant, except for those components such a the receipt printer where user access is unavoidable.
6 . It may be a good idea to allow small claims to be cashed anywhere in the system. This way, any bogus tickets should he spotted a quickly as possible. This will also help the operator detect any rogue merchants running completely bogus vcnding operations with unauthorised equipment.
7. This will not help, however, with another possible attack on the vending machine's tamper resistance. This is where a wiretap is used to reveal which machine sold a winning ticket (whethcr directly, or from puhlished information ahout where a prizewinner lives); the attacker then burgles the shop, steals the machine and digs the authentication keys or logs out of it. So vending machines should not contain enough information to forge a ticket, cxccpt in tho instant that a genuine ticket is being printed.
There are some secondary design concerns here. How will the machines validate the lower-value tickets that are paid ont locally -only online? Or will some of the authenticator code be kept in the vending station? Dut in that case, how do WO cape with the accidental or malicious destruction of the machine that sold a jackpot winning ticket, and how do we pay small winnings when the machine that sold the ticlcet is ominc?
8. Close attention has to he paid to failure modes.
If random errors and system failurcv cm load to individual gain thcu, as with some burglar alarm systems [12], deliberate attempts to cause failure can be expected. They may lead not just to occasional frauds lint also t.0 more widespread service denial.
9.
Some attention has to be paid to whcther the tiystem should collect evidence with a view to resolving possihle dispntes with franchisees, and if so what form it should take. The naive approach is to ask for everything to carry a digital signature, hut this is largely irrelevant to the kind of attack oue expects from the experience of electricity token vending [5] ~ riamcly ttiat a vcndor scllv il large numher of tickets and then reports thc machiric stolen. Tha solution is likely to involve contractual obligations, insurance, and monitoring of vending machines by the central server.
10. There should he enough privacy protection to prevent punters learning the pattern of bets; even if the draw is random, other pcoplc's choice ol nuinhers will not be, and this will skew thc odds. The publishad history of jackpots gives some information on this (it is already extensively analysed) hut oue should not give out any more information, unless the operator decides to as a matter of policy. If it were believed tlint insiders had an advantage by knowing the popularity of each number, this could seriously erode confidcncc. (There is no realistic way to stop a clever vcndiug ngcnt rigging up some mcans of collecting local statistics, but at least the authantic national statistics should be protected.)
11. Some candidates suggested using the BBC's broadcast radio clack signal as an authentication xxiii input to the vending terminals; but one candidate correctly pointed out that this signal could he jammed without much difficulty. This was a highly effective suggestion, in the sense that when it was mentioned to a colleague who had recently done an audit of a different online gaming system, his response was 'Ohs***!'
Reasoning about particular protec-
The third type of contribution from the candidates can be roughly classed as reasoning about particular mechanisms tion mechanisms 1. Five candidates discussed the kind of authenticator needed to validate the ticket. One suggested a digital signature; one reasoned that a MAC4 would do; three pointed out that even a random number generated by the central server would be enough (though a MAC might be more convenient).
2.
There was some discussion of how one should eliminate single points of vulnerability such as the encryption devices that would generate authenticators if this were done algorithmically. There was also some reasoning about separation of duty, such as how to prevent any single individual from being able to validate a jackpot win. One might, for example, have 'orange' and 'blue' encryption boxes (if encryption were used to gencratc authenticators) or databases (if the authenticators were randomly generated) and have the call centre send out an orange manager and a blue manager to visit the winner and check the claim. [13] ). And in any case, how do you prevent yourself being laid open to service denial attacks? There are similar tradeoffs involving security and resilience when we consider whether to put the value counters at the server, in the terminals, or in both. Managing these tradeoffs may involve several iterations of a detailed design, with criticism from a number of bright people in parallel.
4. Some candidates discussed the level of reliance that could be placed on physical ticket security technologies, such as holograms; the general consensus was that the stock is bound to bc stolen. Thus the primary protection should be digital not physical. However, having a printed serial number on the ticket costs little and may do some good if it is also an input to the MAC or other authentication process. This way, a crook has to do some physical forgery as well. Serial numbors might also provide a second level control against wiretap attacks, as one might transmit only the first few digits of the serial number to the server and arrange matters so that the remaining digits were a MAC computed with a key known only to the ticket printing company.
The candidates came up with quite a number of checklist items of the kind that desiguers often overlook ~ c.g. 'tickets must bc associated with a particular draw'. This might seem obvious, but a protocol design which used a purchase date, ticket serial number and server-supplied random challenge as input to a MAC computation might appear plausible to a superficial inspection. The evaluator might not check to see whether a shopkeeper could manufacture tickets that could be used in morc than one draw. Experienced designers appreciate the value of such checklists.
The user interface design also needs some care.
We mentioned abovc that one should ask for telophone claims of big wins after the draw, then delay payment for a week or two in the hope that any duplicated winning ticket will become evident. This delay can be used for (and excused by) due diligence activities such as getting a sworn statement from each jackpot winner that the ticket is theirs, and that they are not cheating on a partner or a syndicate with an equity stake xxiv in the win ~ an activity which has given rise to most of the publiciscd disputes ovor tho years.
7.
As the company will want to convince outsiders that it is not chcating, it might veer towards involving third parties in many of the protection mechanisms. For example, in order to secure the database of bets before the draw, it would be natural to use a third party timestamping service rather than simply having a spars copy of a CD of the database; if a spare database were preferred, then one might leave it with a bank rather than at an in-house backup site. what audit requirements the taxman will imAs we work through these details, it becomes clear that for most of the system, 'Trusted' means not juvt tamper resistant but subject to approved audit and batch control mechanisms. I had expected a negative Correlation between education and lottery participation (many chnrches already denonnce tho lattcry ils a regressive tax on thc p a r , the weak and tho Icss oducated) but the strcngth OC this correlation surprised me. So the above security analysis was done essentially blind -that is, without looking at the existing systcm. Subsequent observation of the procedures actually implemented by Carnelot suggests only two lnrther issues.
1. Firstly, the Camclot rules allow srnali Ganchisees to pay wins of up to 2500, while thc agencies in main Post Offices can pay np to 210,000. This seams a better idea than our 4.2.6; it makes it R lot harder to rim a bogus vending operation. Wins in the E500-E10,000 range are much commoner than jackpots, and main Post Ofices are much harder to 'forge' than corner shops.
2. Secondly, the tickets arc numbered as suggested in 4.3.4, biit printed on continuous stock. The selected bet numbers and authentication codes are printed an the front, while pre-printed serial numbers appear on the back. This may have both advantages and disadvantages. If a standard retail receipt printer i8 usod, it can produce a paper audit roll with a copy af all tickets printed. This may well be more convincing to a judgc tlian any cryptographic protection for electronic logs.
On the other hand, the audit roll might Cacilitate ticket forgery as in 4.2.7, and there may be synchronisation prohlems (thc samplc ticket I purchacd has two succcssivc serial nnm1)ers on the back). When synchronising tickets with serial numbers, one will have to consider everything from ticket refunds to how operators will initialise a new roll of paper in the ticket printer, and what sort of mistakes they will make.
The final drafting of the threat model, security policy and detailed functional design is now left as an exercise to the reader.
Discussion and Conclusions
Linux and Apache prove that software maintenance can he done in parallel; the experiment reported in this paper shows that requirements engineering can too.
There has been collahorative specification development before, as with the 'set-discuss' mailing list used to gather feodhack during the development of the SET protocol for electronic payments. IIowever, such mechanisms tend to have been rather ad-hoc, and limited to debugging a specification that was substautially completed in advance by a single team. The contribution of this paper is twofold: to show that it is possible to parallelise right from the start of the exercise, and to illustrate how much value one can add in a remarkably short period of time. Our approach is a kind of structured hrainstorming, and where a complete specification is required for a new kind of system to a very tight deadlino, it looks unbeatable: it produced high quality input at cvcry level Crom policy through threat analysis to technical design detail.
The bottleneck is the labour required to edit the contributions into shapo. In the case of this paper, the time I spent marking scripts, then rereading them, thinking about them and drafting the paper was about five working days. A system specification would usu. ally need less polishing than a paper aimed at publication, but the time saved would have been spent on other activities such as doing a formal matrix analysis of threats and protection mechanisms, and finalising the functional design.
Finally, there is an interesting parallel with testing. It is known that different testers find the same bugs at different rates ~ even if Alice and Bob are equally productive on average, a hug that Alice finds after half an hour will only be spotted by Bob after several days, and vice versa. This is because different people have different areas of focus in the testing space. The consequence is that it is often cheaper to do testing in parallel rather than series, as the average time spent finding each bug goes down [14]. The exercise reported in this paper strongly supports the notion that the same economics apply to requirements engineering too. Rather than paying a single consultant to think about a problem for twenty days, it will often be more efficient to pay fifteen consultants to think about it for a day each and then have an editor spend a week hammering their ideas into a single coherent document.
